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INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM FOR MYANMAR • MÉCANISME D'ENQUÊTE INDÉPENDANT POUR LE MYANMAR

THE DESTRUCTION AND DISPOSSESSION OF ROHINGYA LAND AND PROPERTY DURING THE 2017 CLEARANCE OPERATIONS – PUBLIC SUMMARY

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CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1
II. Methodology 2
III. International law 5
IV. Evidence of destruction, demolition and replacement 5
V. Analysis of evidence 11
VI. Reparations 17
VII. Conclusion 17

I. Introduction

1. In August 2017, the Myanmar military launched a campaign of mass atrocities against the Rohingya population of Rakhine state, marked by the burning of villages, mass killings and widespread sexual violence. The violence resulted in the forced displacement of over 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State into Bangladesh. The clearance operations that began on 25 August 2017 were the culmination of decades of systemic persecution and disenfranchisement of the Rohingya population. Long before the 2017 atrocities, the Rohingya had been stripped of citizenship, excluded from education, denied healthcare, and marginalized from political participation.[1]

2. The United Nations Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar ("Mechanism" or IIMM) has investigated emblematic cases where Rohingya villages were destroyed by the Myanmar military during the 2017 clearance operations, demolished and razed, and replaced with Border Guard Police (BGP) Battalion bases. Following this investigation, the Mechanism prepared a report titled "Destruction and Dispossession of Rohingya Land and Property during the 2017 Clearance Operations: Evidence Analysis" which contains confidential witness and

source information and is available to national and international authorities to facilitate investigations and judicial proceedings that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes, in line with the Mechanism's Terms of Reference. This document is a summary of the evidence and analysis contained in the full report.

3. In this investigation, the Mechanism aimed to identify: a) the entities and associated individuals who ordered, oversaw, carried out and financially benefitted from the destruction and demolition of Rohingya villages and the construction of BGP Battalion bases on top of the razed villages; b) those entities' and individuals' contributions to serious international crimes; and c) their current locations.[2] The Mechanism also aimed to identify and set out the types of loss suffered by Rohingya due to these acts, including the dispossession of land and property, and the loss of livelihoods and the community's connection to their ancestral homeland through the destruction of cemeteries and mosques.

4. The evidence summarized below is intended to facilitate proceedings in national, regional or international courts. It also provides a foundation for reparations. Justice for the Rohingya requires reparations that go beyond symbolic acknowledgment. Reparations, in international law and practice, are not merely about compensation but about recognition of crimes, restoration of dignity, and measures to prevent the recurrence of such crimes. The precedent of *Wiedergutmachung* after the Holocaust underscores that reparations are a moral obligation and a necessary foundation for future reconciliation of communities.

II. Methodology

5. The analysis conducted by the Mechanism relied on a range of evidentiary sources, including witness statements collected by the Mechanism, photographic and video documentation, land and property records including those preserved by Rohingya who fled the violence, geospatial imagery and open-source material such as statements by Myanmar officials and corporate executives. The investigation concentrated on seven village tracts in northern Rakhine State, where Rohingya villages were destroyed during the August 2017 clearance operations and subsequently replaced with BGP Battalion bases. These include: 1) Rohingya villages in U Daung village tract, replaced by No. 4 BGP Battalion base; 2) Rohingya villages in Myo Thu Gyi (Hainda Fara) village tract, replaced by No. 5 BGP Battalion base; 3) Rohingya villages in Inn Din (Aung Dung) village tract, replaced by No. 6 BGP Battalion base; 4) Rohingya villages in Aung Seik Pyin (Done Paik) village tract, replaced by No. 7 BGP Battalion base; 5) Rohingya farmland in Ah Lel Chaung (Ali Yong) village tract, replaced by No. 8 BGP Battalion base; 6) Rohingya villages in Myin Hlut (May Rulla) village tract, replaced by No. 9 BGP Battalion base; and 7) Rohingya village Hpu Khar Li (Fut Hali) in Zin Paing Nyar (Doinor Zum Boyim Na) village tract, replaced by No. 10 BGP Battalion base (*See Figure 1: Timeline of Rohingya village destruction, clearance and construction of BGP bases* and *Figure 2: Map of locations under investigation by IIMM)*.

6. The Mechanism selected these locations because they demonstrate a systematic pattern whereby villages and farmland were destroyed and razed between late 2017 and early 2018 and were rapidly supplanted by BGP Battalion bases. While the Mechanism is investigating additional sites, the seven villages identified provide the strongest evidentiary record to date that

the 2017 clearance operations combined land seizure, targeted destruction of livelihoods, and forced displacement to erase Rohingya presence from their ancestral homeland.

7. In this investigation, the Mechanism proceeded with the understanding that Myanmar's leasehold-based land system, regulated by multiple laws and related regulations, vests land ownership in the State while granting individuals and communities various use and tenure rights, including cultivation, inheritance, transfer and mortgage.[3] To substantiate Rohingya claims of land and property rights, the Mechanism collected a broad set of official documents, reflecting both individual and communal tenure. These included land registration records,[4] land tax certificates (*horonsor*),[5] cadastral maps (Forms 105/106)[6] and revenue-stamped contracts,[7] alongside evidence of agricultural transactions with state entities such as the Myanmar Agricultural Produce Trading agency.[8] Collectively, these documents demonstrate that Rohingya land rights were formally recognized through administrative channels, even as the Rohingya were denied citizenship and excluded from broader legal protections. The Mechanism also identified communal documents, such as village applications for water reservoir construction,[9] which indicate state recognition of Rohingya as settled inhabitants with rights to use and manage natural resources.

Figure 1: Timeline of Rohingya village destruction, demolition, razing and construction of BGP Battalion bases

Locations	Destruction during the 2017 clearance operations	Demolition and razing	Construction of BGP Battalion bases	BGP Battalion base
U Daung	1 September 2017[10]	8 February 2018 - 24 February 2018[11] - late 2018[12]	2016 - 2018[13]	**No. 4**
Myo Thu Gyi (Hainda Fara)	25 - 30 August 2017[14]	12 December 2017 - 24 February 2018[15]	Completed by 28 September 2019[16]	**No. 5**
Inn Din (Aung Dung)	25 August – 22 September 2017[17]	December 2017 - 24 February 2018[18]	February 2018[19] - 25 August 2019[20]	**No. 6**
Aung Seik Pyin (Done Paik)	25 August - 25 September 2017[21]	October 2017 - April 2018[22]	Began in early 2018[23]	**No. 7**
Ah Lel Chaung (Ali Yong)	Farmland confiscation October 2017[24] - 13 December 2017[25]	December 2017 - 24 February 2018[26]	Completed by 23 January 2020[27]	**No. 8**
Myin Hlut (May Rulla)	25 - 30 August 2017[28]	26 December 2017[29] - 24 February 2018[30]	Began in April 2018[31]	**No. 9**
Hpu Khar Li (Fut Hali)	28 August 2017[32]	1 December 2017[33] - April 2018[34]	Began in April 2018[35]	**No. 10**

Figure 2: Map of locations under investigation by IIMM



III. International law

8. The International Court of Justice has held that under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention"),[36] deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a group includes the systematic expulsion from and destruction of homes.[37] Jurisprudence from international criminal tribunals also recognizes that forced displacement, destruction of property, and denial of return to one's home cause severe physical, psychological and material harm. In *Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolmir*, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that the underlying acts of genocide may include "methods of destruction that do not immediately kill the members of the group, but ultimately seek their physical destruction" such as by "systematically expelling members of the group from their homes".[38] In *Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić*, the ICTY underscored the mental harm suffered due to the prohibition on return, describing it as a traumatic rupture of the relationship with one's home territory.[39] The forcible transfer and destruction of homes in Srebrenica were seen as a deliberate signal that the victims had no home to return to.[40] In *Prosecutor v. Kayishema*, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) interpreted the deliberate infliction of "conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention to include the withholding of adequate living accommodations, contributing to the group's physical destruction.[41] In *Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić*, the ICTY recognized the psychosocial consequences of displacement, citing long-term feelings of anxiety, helplessness and betrayal, which undermined displaced persons' capacity to rebuild their lives.[42] In conducting this investigation, the Mechanism paid particular attention to international law on State responsibility and the individual responsibility of direct perpetrators, their military commanders and civilian superiors, as well as those who have aided or abetted in the commission of these crimes.

9. Under international law, victims who suffered direct harm,[43] including physical, mental, material,[44] or long-term generational impacts,[45] are eligible for reparations, as are indirect victims such as immediate family members.[46] Reparations may take individual or collective forms,[47] including restitution, monetary compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction measures such as truth disclosure and public apologies, and commemorations.[48] Asset seizure remains an important mechanism to ensure reparations are meaningfully implemented. International jurisprudence,[49] such as the ICJ's decision in the *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo* case, provides a framework for quantifying large-scale harm, even where precise valuation is difficult.[50] Reparations are central to justice, aiming to acknowledge harm and provide redress in ways that prioritize victims' needs.[51]

IV. Evidence of destruction, demolition and replacement

A. U Daung village tract - No. 4 BGP Battalion Base

10. In 2017, U Daung village tract had six Rohingya villages: Ah Shey (Phuk Fara), Hpar Ti (Faskoree Bil), Kon Tan/U Daung Ah Nauk (Posim Fara), Myauk (Uttor Fara), Kon Tan (Deil Fara), Zon Mar (Zome Mar) and one *Na Ta La* government-established settlement for non-

Rohingya ethnic communities called U Daung Na Ta La.[52] The Rohingya community in U Daung were farmers,[53] market shopkeepers, operated shrimp and fish hatcheries, and had other businesses.[54]

11. During the clearance operations that began on 25 August 2017, Myanmar security forces[55] burned Rohingya villages in U Daung, forcing residents to flee.[56] One witness told the Mechanism that after escaping to Bangladesh, he learned from the local Head of 100 Households or *Ra Eain Muu* that all Rohingya homes in U Daung had been destroyed.[57] According to the witness, none of the Rohingya villages in the U Daung village tract survived the attacks.[58]

12. In the aftermath, the remnants of Rohingya homes in U Daung were systematically demolished. Aerial photographs taken in April 2018 show partially razed, barren areas of land marked by bulldozer tracks in U Daung village tract, alongside burned remnants of a Rohingya village.[59] By late 2018, the marketplace, including businesses owned by witnesses who spoke to the Mechanism, was bulldozed.[60] Under a civilian government public-private partnership established in late 2017 for development projects in Rakhine State, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine (UEHRD) Repatriation and Resettlement project,[61] Ngwe Taung Tan Company Limited cleared 30 acres of burned Rohingya land with heavy machinery and labourers,[62] also targeting other destroyed areas in Maungdaw township.[63] The No. 4 Border Guard Police Battalion base, the construction of which began in 2016, was extended over a former marketplace, where Rohingya once traded fish and vegetables.[64]

13. Following the 2017 clearance operations, Rohingya farmland in U Daung[65] that was characterized by Myanmar authorities as having become "ownerless"[66] and "belonging to farmers who fled to Bangladesh"[67] was harvested[68] and non-Rohingya communities resettled in the area were given agricultural machinery, seeds and livestock inputs by government authorities.[69]

B. Myo Thu Gyi village tract - No. 5 BGP Battalion base

14. Myo Thu Gyi (Hainda Fara) village tract is located to the east of Maungdaw town and Myo Ma Ka Nyin Tan (Shidar Fara), west of 3-Mile Ward, south of Myo U (Etaillya), and north of Nyaung Chaung (Hadir Bil) in Maungdaw township. The Maungdaw–Buthidaung highway divides Myo Thu Gyi into two parts. On the northern side of the highway there were two Rohingya villages: Kan Kya North (Uttor Fara) and Ra Zar Bil. On the southern side there were three Rohingya villages: Kan Kya South (Doin Fara), Ywar Haung (Puran Fara) and Thaung Paing Nyar (Saun Boinnya) and one *Na Ta La* government-established settlement for non-Rohingya ethnic communities called Wai Thar Li.[70] In the Rohingya villages of Myo Thu Gyi, Rohingya engaged in farming, ran shops in the market, and carried out other business activities. The villages had several schools, mosques, cemeteries and ponds.[71]

15. Before August 2017, Rohingya residents of Myo Thu Gyi possessed extensive land, homes and businesses, substantiated by inheritance, purchase and formal registration documents. Witnesses described inheriting and acquiring land, possessing houses, shops and entire market areas, and cultivating large tracts of farmland.[72] Some families traced back their possession over generations, with supporting documentation from both Myanmar and even British colonial

records.[73] Although many official documents were lost or destroyed during the clearance operations, witness accounts confirm that Rohingya land rights were broad and recognized by local authorities.[74] Rohingya actively used their land for agriculture and commerce, cultivating crops, raising livestock, and generating significant income, which supported both their families and the local economy.[75] Geospatial imagery further confirms the existence of 307 intact structures in Kan Kya North village and 518 intact structures in Kan Kya South prior to the 2017 violence.[76]

16. Witness accounts,[77] journalist reports,[78] video evidence,[79] geospatial imagery[80] and internal correspondence from the Rakhine State authorities[81] collected and analyzed by the Mechanism all confirm the burning and razing of Rohingya homes, markets and religious buildings in Myo Thu Gyi during the clearance operations that began on 25 August 2017.

17. After the Rohingya were displaced from their farmland, Rakhine State authorities deployed the Agricultural Mechanisation Department to harvest 934 acres of crops across multiple villages "where there were terrorist attacks [that] were facing difficulties in harvesting monsoon rice," including in Myo Thu Gyi.[82]

18. By early 2018, under the UEHRD Repatriation and Resettlement project, Mayu A Hla company cleared over 411 acres of burned Rohingya land with heavy machinery and labourers.[83] By 2019, the BGP constructed No. 5 BGP Battalion base directly over the former village of Kan Kya South.[84] The construction of the base was overseen by the Commander of No. 1 BGP Command Office in Kyee Kan Pyin, Maungdaw, [redacted] with Engineer [redacted] from Asia World Company leading a team of 326 workers to build a base with a guardhouse, ordinance store, barracks for junior and senior officers.[85] Video footage,[86] photographs,[87] aerial footage,[88] and geospatial imagery[89] show destroyed Rohingya homes and farmland being flattened to make way for the construction of the No. 5 BGP Battalion base[90] (*See Annex 1: Example of referenced imagery from Myo Thu Gyi – No. 5 BGP Battalion base*). Cumulatively, this evidence shows the deliberate destruction, razing and reappropriation of Rohingya land in Myo Thu Gyi, leaving its former inhabitants permanently dispossessed and unable to return.

C. Inn Din village tract - No. 6 BGP Battalion base

19. Before August 2017, Inn Din (Aung Dung) village tract consisted of five villages with a population of about 7,000, the vast majority of whom were Rohingya. During the clearance operations, Myanmar security forces working with ethnic Rakhine civilians burned Rohingya homes and expelled the Rohingya population.[91] Geospatial sensors detected multiple active fires in Inn Din on 28 August 2017, corroborating IIMM witness accounts of mass burning.[92] Geospatial analysis shows that by 22 September 2017, nearly all of Inn Din (East, Middle, Rakhine and West) had been destroyed – 719 out of 739 structures were reduced to ash – while Pe Yong (a *Na Ta La* government-established settlement for non-Rohingya ethnic communities) remained untouched.[93] Geospatial imagery shows scorched terrain, debris, and burned trees.

20. Following the destruction, Myanmar authorities repurposed Rohingya land for BGP use. Construction of the No. 6 BGP Battalion base began in late 2017 and was largely completed by August 2019.[94] The base, covering approximately 75 hectares, was built directly over the

remains of Inn Din (East and Rakhine) villages, with cleared land replaced by new roads, permanent buildings, fortified compounds and two helipads. [95] Around 124 new structures and semi-permanent buildings were also constructed nearby,[96] consolidating the BGP's presence. This absorption of Rohingya land into the fortified No. 6 BGP Battalion base made permanent the displacement of Rohingya from Inn Din and the erasure of their villages.

D. Aung Seik Pyin (Done Paik) village tract - No. 7 BGP Battalion base

21. Aung Seik Pyin (Done Paik) village tract in Maungdaw township consists of four Rohingya villages: Bo Bar (Bois Sawr), Done Paik (Dum Bai), Kyet Kyein (Saadullar Sawr), Ree Dar and Ran Aung Pyin, and one *Na Ta La* government-established settlement for non-Rohingya ethnic communities called Ran Aung Pyin.[97] The Rohingya engaged in farming,[98] operated shrimp and fish hatcheries, ran shops both within the village and in the nearby Kyein Chaung market, and pursued other business activities. They owned land, houses and businesses in the area.[99]

22. Witness accounts and documentary evidence collected by the Mechanism demonstrate that Rohingya families in Aung Seik Pyin possessed and actively used land for residential, agricultural and livelihood purposes prior to the 2017 clearance operations, with formally documented through government records. One witness detailed his family's inheritance and purchase of paddy fields and grazing land, supported by official registration documents,[100] and described using the land for livestock that sustained his wife and [redacted] children, while noting that part of his residential land was later taken after the 2017 clearance operations for the No. 7 BGP Battalion base.[101] Another witness similarly described extensive family landholdings inherited through both paternal and maternal lines, corroborated by maps of fields and ponds, showing active agricultural use. [102] Together, these accounts and documents provide consistent and credible evidence of longstanding Rohingya land possession, inheritance and livelihood dependence, underscoring their deeply rooted presence in the area prior to August 2017.

23. UNOSAT analysis of available geospatial imagery detected that the villages of Bo Bar, Done Paik and Ree Dar were fully destroyed by the Myanmar military, including by burning, on or around 25 August 2017.[103] Prior to the clearance operations, there were approximately 400 intact structures in Bo Bar, 364 structures in Ree Dar, and 431 structures in Done Paik.[104] Between 25 August and mid-October 2017, Bo Bar, Ree Dar and Done Paik villages were destroyed – first by fire, with available geospatial imagery showing scorched terrain in the damaged area, as well as visible dark debris and darkened and burned trees in between the damaged structures.[105] The few remaining buildings were destroyed between October 2017 and April 2018 in a visible demolition process.[106]

24. No. 7 BGP Battalion base was built on land where Done Paik and Ree Dar villages once stood. The construction began in early 2018 and continued until 21 April 2021.[107] No. 7 BGP Battalion base consisted of a large compound, containing warehouses and large structures, observation towers, and a helipad.[108]

E. Ah Lel Chaung village tract - No. 8 BGP Battalion base

25. Ah Lel Chaung village tract in Buthidaung township had two Rohingya villages: Let Thar (Azoli Fara) and Ah Lel Chaung (Ali Young).[109] Extensive documentary and witness evidence confirm that Rohingya residents of Ah Lel Chaung village tract owned, inherited and cultivated land and property for generations prior to the 2017 clearance operations.[110] Witnesses provided the Mechanism with official land tax certificates,[111] township-issued documents,[112] and video footage,[113] identifying their agricultural plots, homes and communal resources such as water ponds.[114] These records, some issued as recently as 2014–2015,[115] show that Myanmar authorities formally recognized Rohingya land possession, maintaining detailed records of Rohingya property prior to seizing it. Land possession was not only legal and documented but also deeply tied to family inheritance[116] and community life.

26. Witness accounts, photos and video footage collected after August 2017 reveal how Rohingya farmland was seized for the construction of No. 8 BGP Battalion base in early December 2017.[117] Villagers reported being dispossessed of hundreds of acres of farmland,[118] with seized areas marked by red flags.[119] Entire families were displaced when their land, which provided food, grazing space and income, was seized[120] and razed.[121] Some landholders described losing ancestral fields cultivated for three generations,[122] while business owners reported being forced to sell livestock when grazing land was taken.[123] A plan signed off by three separate sections of the Department of Agricultural Land Management and Statistics contains a map demarcating in red where the No. 8 BGP Battalion base would be built accompanied by a table delineating the land plots set to be absorbed into the 333-acre base.[124] The aforementioned evidence from 2017 through 2020 confirm the construction of permanent security infrastructure directly on confiscated Rohingya farmland, transforming Rohingya-farmed rice paddies in Ah Lel Chaung into the No. 8 BGP Battalion base by January 2020.[125]

27. These confiscations destroyed the Rohingya community's means of survival, directly driving displacement into Bangladesh.[126] Villagers consistently expressed that once their lands were seized, they could no longer farm, feed their families, or remain in their homes.[127] Myanmar security forces and Rakhine civilians looted livestock[128] and beat villagers,[129] compounding the loss of Rohingya livelihood. The construction of the No. 8 BGP Battalion base rendered the land permanently inaccessible to Rohingya, leaving survivors with no option but flight.[130] One man from Ah Lel Chaung linked the confiscation of land to his displacement, saying "Our lands have been taken away, and we do not have anything to do here and will not be able to survive here, so we will have to go from here."[131]

F. Myin Hlut - No. 9 BGP Battalion base

28. Myin Hlut, known in Rohingya as May Rulla, is a village tract in Maungdaw township,[132] which had a majority Rohingya population spread along fertile land near the coast.[133] Myin Hlut village tract contained Rohingya villages and the vibrant Myin Hlut town, made up of Hpwe Yar quarter, A Lae Paing (Middle) quarter, Kyaung Taung quarter, A Nauk Paing (Western) quarter and A Shae Paing (Eastern) quarter.[134]

29. Witness statements and official documents collected by the Mechanism demonstrate that Rohingya residents of Myin Hlut possessed, cultivated and transacted in land and property over generations prior to August 2017. Their possession extended across agricultural fields, commercial shrimp hatcheries, [135] residential compounds [136] and commercial properties, [137] often secured through inheritance, [138] purchase or dowry, [139] and recorded in contracts with state revenue stamps and land tax receipts. Witness accounts further show that this land and property formed the backbone of Rohingya livelihoods in Myin Hlut. Witnesses described managing farmland, [140] shrimp hatcheries [141] and fishing boats, while others operated shops in the local market [142] and betel nut gardens. [143]

30. At least 30 documents collected by the Mechanism spanning from 1980 to 2016 corroborate these claims, showing a clear pattern of legal land transactions and intergenerational possession that refutes portrayals of Rohingya as temporary or informal occupants. [144] *Horonsor* (land tax) certificates show that Rohingya regularly paid fees to local government offices, underscoring the recognition of Rohingya land use by the authorities. [145] Contracts were recorded for transactions where land was used to secure credit, reinforcing its value as collateral for loans. [146] This documentation reveals a diversified local economy rooted in land use and management, with Rohingya property providing not only sustenance but also employment, trade, economic assets and security for Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. [147]

31. This established way of life was violently disrupted during and after the August 2017 clearance operations. Myanmar security forces, often working with ethnic Rakhine civilians, burned Rohingya homes, shops and schools, forcing residents to flee. [148]

32. Survivors reported that entire areas were bulldozed, leaving only overgrown vegetation where once the homes, schools and businesses of thriving Rohingya communities had stood. [149] UEHRD, a government development project, engaged a local company called Kyi Brothers [150] to clear 418 acres of burned Rohingya land in Myin Hlut. [151] Aerial photographs taken in April 2018 show barren areas of land marked by bulldozer tracks, machinery next to piles of timber and debris, and the three newly constructed buildings of No. 9 BGP Battalion base with a partially built perimeter wall. [152] Geospatial imagery confirms the construction of the No. 9 BGP Battalion base on the site of demolished Rohingya villages by 2021. The base, spanning roughly 85 hectares, now permanently occupies land that was once central to Rohingya life, entrenching their dispossession and preventing return. [153]

G. Hpu Khar Li, Zin Paing Nyar village tract - No. 10 BGP Battalion base

33. Zing Paing Nyar is a village tract in Maungdaw township comprised of six Rohingya villages: Kywe Htar Pyin, Haw Ri Tu Lar, Hpu Khar Li, That Zay Kone, Zin Paing Nyar and Doe Tan. [154]

34. Witness statements collected by the Mechanism contain evidence of Rohingya land possession and use in the Rohingya village of Hpu Khar Li in Zin Paing Nyar village tract. [155] Multiple generations of Rohingya families in Hpu Khar Li engaged in farming and business ownership; one witness described how his father and uncle had 3–4 *kani* [156] of paddy land and a black shrimp hatchery, all registered under his grandfather. [157] Although high transfer costs prevented the land from being formally re-registered in his own name, the witness described

how in 2010 he updated the inheritance records through official channels, involving payments to the Land Management Office and approval by a police officer.[158] Another former resident and landowner from Hpu Khar Li described how he lost 35 *kani* of land that was absorbed into No. 10 BGP Battalion base.[159] Witnesses were consistently able to describe to the Mechanism the precise location of their land in relation to the village mosque, village road and surrounding paddy fields.

35. Under the UEHRD Repatriation and Resettlement project, a local company called 25th Group cleared over 432 acres of Rohingya land that had been burned around 28 August 2017,[160] deploying heavy machinery and labourers in Zin Paing Nyar and adjacent village tracts.[161] Aerial footage taken on 9 April 2018 shows plots of razed land marked with bulldozer tracks interspersed with untouched farmland.[162] No. 10 BGP Battalion base was built over 50 *kani* of Rohingya villagers' land in Zin Paing Nyar village tract.[163] Video footage taken after the No. 10 BGP Battalion base was built shows barbed wire fences and a watch tower along a road in Hpu Khar Li.[164]

V. Analysis of evidence

A. Myanmar authorities destroyed cemeteries and mosques, sites of Rohingya ancestral connection to their homeland

36. Evidence collected by the Mechanism shows that Myanmar security forces and State-contracted companies deliberately destroyed Rohingya cemeteries, mosques and other communal landmarks during and after the 2017 clearance operations. Witness accounts describe how villages such as Myo Thu Gyi[165] and Ah Lel Chaung[166] once contained mosques, cemeteries, schools and markets, which were systematically burned, bulldozed and demolished. Video footage from December 2017 shows bulldozers actively razing mosques in Myo Thu Gyi[167] and Ah Lel Chaung,[168] while witnesses confirmed that BGP Battalion bases were built on the land on which the mosques and cemeteries once stood.[169]

37. The replacement of mosques and cemeteries with BGP Battalion bases severed the Rohingya ancestral connection to their homeland. By paving over sacred and communal spaces, the authorities obliterated material proof of Rohingya history, making future claims of belonging or return more difficult. By destroying cultural and religious property, Myanmar security forces and Rakhine State authorities physically displaced Rohingya communities and disrupted their cultural continuity in northern Rakhine State.

B. Myanmar authorities knew that Rohingya possessed and used land and property in Rakhine State

38. The evidence collected by the Mechanism establishes that Myanmar authorities had full knowledge of Rohingya land rights and land use in Rakhine State. Rohingya landholders held multiple official documents such as land tax receipts, revenue stamps, inheritance transfers and usage permits, issued by township administrations under the General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). These documents covered not only agricultural and residential land, but also specific resources such as drinking water ponds, demonstrating a granular administrative record of Rohingya property. The cadastral record-

keeping of Rohingya land – registered under the *Rohingya* Muslim names of the landholders rather than adopted Burmese names – through Form 105/106 and consistent issuance of *horonsor* land tax certificates further indicates the State's acknowledgment of Rohingya as taxpaying landholders. Such documentation undermines any claim that Rohingya's rights to land was informal or illegal; rather, it reveals a deliberate and structured system of recognition and control by Rakhine State and GAD authorities prior to the 2017 clearance operations.

39. Documentary evidence shows that the Rakhine State authorities and in particular the GAD kept detailed records and valuations of property destroyed and damaged in prior outbreaks of violence.[170] The BGP and Land Management Office also kept records of Rohingya[171] and non-Rohingya landholders' plots of farmland that would be impacted by the construction of BGP Battalion bases.[172] This shows Myanmar authorities' ability to register destruction and damage to Rohingya property, reference it against the areas on which BGP Battalion bases were built, and estimate its value.

40. Further, witness accounts demonstrate that Myanmar security forces regularly extorted Rohingya landholders to pay for the protection of their property. Witnesses reported that military units threatened to burn entire Rohingya villages unless payments were made, explicitly targeting homes, farmland and other property of value.[173] These extortion practices, carried out during the clearance operations, not only reflect direct acknowledgment by the military of Rohingya land tenure but also its weaponization as a tool of coercion. The recurring nature of such extortion across multiple villages indicates an organized practice within Myanmar security forces.

41. Evidence indicates that senior Union and Rakhine State-level officials were aware that the Rohingya population possessed, cultivated and relied upon extensive agricultural land in northern Rakhine State. It would also be obvious to all such officials that the 2017 clearance operations had caused such widespread flight of the Rohingya population to Bangladesh that there were insufficient Rohingya farmers remaining in northern Rakhine to manually harvest the 2017 crops, thereby necessitating the use of specialized machinery.[174] Ellen Goldstein, then Country Director of the World Bank in Myanmar, described discussions with the Union Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation about "the farmers who grew the grain, who are now in the refugee camps in Bangladesh".[175] The Ministry considered proposals to harvest the crops using World Bank-funded machinery, including options to return the grain or its monetary value to displaced Rohingya refugees.[176] The Ministry ultimately harvested 5,549 acres of paddy fields that had become "ownerless,"[177] and "belonging to farmers who fled to Bangladesh"[178] using machinery provided by the Mechanized Agriculture Department[179] in U Daung,[180] Myo Thu Gyi,[181] Aung Seik Pyin,[182] Myin Hlut,[183] and other locations in northern Rakhine State, and used the proceeds for other purposes.[184] Nonetheless, the engagements with the World Bank further confirm direct state recognition that the lands and agricultural output in question had been farmed by Rohingya, underscoring both prior livelihood use and state knowledge of that fact.[185]

42. The evidence shows that Myanmar authorities were not ignorant of Rohingya land tenure but intentionally leveraged that knowledge to facilitate financial extraction, destruction, and ultimately the dispossession of land and property belonging to the Rohingya community.

C. Erasure of Rohingya villages following the 2017 clearance operations was conducted through organized and systematic demolition and razing

43. Geospatial analysis conducted by UNOSAT documents the extensive and sustained destruction of Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine State during and following the 2017 clearance operations. Between 25 August 2017 and November 2018, 411 settlements across Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships were damaged or destroyed.[186] Updated imagery from February to April 2019 shows continued demolition beyond November 2018 until April 2019.[187] UNOSAT estimates approximately 40,600 structures were destroyed, though likely undercounted by at least 10%.[188] The shift from rapid burning to slow, deliberate razing underscores the systematic and ongoing nature of the destruction.[189]

44. Photographs taken during visits organized by Myanmar authorities for journalists and diplomatic personnel between February and April 2018 further corroborates the systematic erasure of Rohingya villages.[190] Ninety-five such aerial photographs show villages razed to the ground, leaving only barren terrain with consistent patterns of bulldozing, parallel tracks, and uniform land levelling, spanning from Ah Lel Than Kyaw in the south to Taung Pyo Let Wea in the north of Maungdaw township[191] (*See Annex 1: Example of referenced imagery from Myo Thu Gyi – No. 5 BGP Battalion base*). The scale and uniformity of this clearance indicate a coordinated and organized operation, aimed not only at destruction but also at obliterating visible evidence of Rohingya habitation.

45. Witness accounts identify multiple actors responsible for demolition and razing. Witnesses described military engineering units involved in clearing the land in preparation for new BGP Battalion bases,[192] constructing the bases,[193] and assisting in the expansion of the Maungdaw – Ah Ngu Maw road.[194] [redacted] observed engineering units from Kha Maung Seik, Sittwe, Nay Pyi Taw, and Meiktila bulldozing burned villages for police station construction.[195] Private companies also participated; [redacted] recounted meeting a former mid-level military officer serving as a project engineer for the National Prosperity Company (အမျိုးသားကြီးပွားတိုးတက်ရေး ကုမ္ပဏီလီမိတက်), [redacted] clearing burned villages.[196] Another witness, [redacted] confirmed that the bulldozing was part of a State-implemented "town reconstruction plan," requiring high-level authorization and deliberate planning.[197]

46. The Mechanism has also identified at least eight local private companies directly engaged in demolitions. These companies, including Phoe Kan Kaung,[198] Mikko,[199] National Prosperity Company,[200] Mayu A Hla, Moe Hti Chan Thar, 25th Group, Ngwe Taung Tan, and Kyi Brothers Company, [201] deployed heavy machinery to raze Rohingya villages under government authorization and supervision.[202] For example, Mayu A Hla cleared 411 acres in Maungdaw Township with seven excavators and two bulldozers;[203] Moe Hti Chan Thar cleared 200 acres in Tha Win Chaung with nine bulldozers and ten dump trucks; [204] and Kyi Brothers Company cleared 418 acres in Myin Hlut with five bulldozers and eight excavators.[205] These demolitions were funded by the UEHRD Repatriation and Resettlement project and Rakhine State, and exempted from taxes, with progress reports documenting before-and-after images showing

burned Rohingya villages razed to the ground.[206] Collectively, these projects erased entire villages, vegetation, and remnants of Rohingya villages.[207]

47. The ubiquity and consistency of these operations, using bulldozers, excavators and dump trucks to systematically flatten villages across northern Rakhine State, is consistent with an organized campaign aimed at permanently erasing Rohingya presence.[208] By transforming previously inhabited villages into barren terrain, Myanmar authorities destroyed property markers critical for restitution and ensured that displaced Rohingya had no home or property to which they could return.

D. Coordinated re-appropriation of destroyed Rohingya villages for BGP Battalion bases, roads and housing for non-Rohingya ethnic groups

48. Following the 2017 clearance operations in northern Rakhine State and the demolition of burned villages, a coordinated effort involving multiple Myanmar state entities initiated extensive redevelopment projects that re-appropriated destroyed Rohingya villages for infrastructure, BGP Battalion bases, and the settlement of non-Rohingya ethnic groups. Legislation was used to extinguish any claims for land and property restitution. Burned land was reclassified as "Government-managed land" under Myanmar's Natural Disaster Management Law,[209] effectively stripping Rohingya of land rights. In 2018, authorities amended the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law to impose a six-month deadline for applications to retain land rights – a requirement displaced Rohingya could not meet.[210] Witness accounts confirmed that these laws had their intended effect: destruction of villages ensured automatic state repossession,[211] while new legislative requirements foreclosed avenues for Rohingya to return. In so doing, the Myanmar authorities not only carried out the physical destruction of Rohingya villages but also adopted deliberate legislative and administrative acts to terminate all land rights of Rohingya former residents.

49. The Myanmar military deployed engineering units to clear land for new BGP Battalion bases.[212] The Rakhine State Government, under Chief Minister U Nyi Pu, advanced a "town reconstruction plan" requiring bulldozing of burned areas before redevelopment.[213] The UEHRD Repatriation and Resettlement Project, administered through the GAD and the Township Administration Office in Maungdaw,[214] contracted at least five local companies to clear 1,491.733 acres of Rohingya land,[215] granting tax exemptions and paying a total of 2,646,529,600 *kyats* from the Rakhine State budget.[216]

50. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), through Union budget allocations to the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) in 2017-2018 funded the construction of barracks in BGP Battalion bases, including the No. 3 BGP Battalion base in Buthidaung township and the No. 4 BGP Battalion base in Maungdaw township, completing projects started during the 2016-2017 fiscal year.[217] During the 2018-2019 fiscal year, MOHA funded the construction of barracks in the No. 5, No. 6, No. 7 and No. 8 BGP Battalion bases.[218] The BGP itself, including senior commanders, oversaw land confiscation and demolition,[219] with local authorities issuing verbal orders and fencing off areas for new bases.[220] The No. 1 BGP Command Office oversaw the construction of No. 5 and No. 8 BGP Battalion bases.[221] According to one witness who saw the

plans for the BGP Battalion base construction project, each base was projected to cost at least 150 to 200 million *kyat* and was led by military Garrison Engineers.[222]

51. Under the authorization of UEHRD and the Rakhine State government,[223] Asia World Company Limited spearheaded major projects, including a 50-mile road connecting Ah Ngu Maw to Maungdaw,[224] the expansion of which required the destruction of Rohingya homes,[225] and constructed security outposts along its route.[226] Documentation shows that, beginning in January 2018, Engineer [redacted] from Asia World Company was contracted to lead a team of 326 workers to build No. 5 BGP Battalion base in Myo Thu Gyi village tract.[227] One witness, present in the area between late 2017 and 2018, confirmed the company's central role and that Asia World Company funded the project, which was carried out under the auspices of MOHA.[228] Travelling up from Ah Ngu Maw to Maungdaw, he saw three to four newly built police outposts and barracks constructed by Asia World Company, in addition to existing checkpoints.[229]

52. The Myanmar military exercised a degree of oversight over the construction of the BGP Battalion bases. [redacted] a senior commander responsible for the area [redacted] monitor the construction of BGP bases in Taung Pyo Let Wea, could see that the bases were built on empty villages formerly inhabited by Rohingya, noticing that only remnants of fences remained after the majority of houses had been destroyed.[230]

53. Following the construction of the BGP Battalion bases, the BGP occupied and operated the bases built over Rohingya villages, consolidating territorial control through dispossessing Rohingya of their land and property, and foreclosing the possibility of their return. The No. 4 BGP Battalion base was built directly over the former U Daung marketplace, erasing a central hub of Rohingya economic and social life where families once traded fish and vegetables.[231] Geospatial imagery captured in 2019[232] and video footage from 2020[233] show that Kan Kya South village in Myo Thu Gyi was entirely replaced by the No. 5 BGP Battalion base. Similarly, the No. 6 Battalion base, spanning approximately 75 hectares, was constructed over the remains of Inn Din village, where Rohingya land was replaced with fortified compounds, permanent structures, new roads and even helipads, while at least 124 new semi-permanent buildings were erected nearby to consolidate BGP presence.[234] The No. 7 BGP Battalion base, built between 2018 and 2021,[235] displaced the villages of Done Paik and Ree Dar, replacing them with large compounds, warehouses, observation towers, fences and a helipad.[236] Photographic and video documentation from 2017 through 2020 further demonstrates how the BGP transformed Rohingya farmland in Ah Lel Chaung into the No. 8 BGP Battalion base, cementing the dispossession of Rohingya property.[237] Aerial photographs taken in April 2018 show the establishment of the No. 9 Battalion base over the demolished Rohingya village of Myin Hlut, spanning roughly 85 hectares, thereby entrenching the permanent exclusion of Rohingya from their ancestral lands in Myin Hlut.[238]

54. MOHA financed and directed the expansion of police and BGP facilities; the BGP directly occupied seized Rohingya lands; and Asia World Company carried out the physical construction of bases, roads, and security outposts that entrenched this territorial control. These measures demonstrate coordinated action by the military, Rakhine State government, UEHRD,

MOHA, GAD, BGP, Asia World Company and local companies in northern Rakhine State in the clearance and dispossession of Rohingya land and property.

55. In addition to constructing infrastructure and BGP Battalion bases, Myanmar authorities directed resources toward the construction of housing for non-Rohingya ethnic communities on seized Rohingya land.[239] Between April and May 2018, hundreds of new houses funded by regional governments and foundations were handed over to ethnic Mro and Daing Net families[240] and recent immigrants from Bangladesh.[241] Senior government officials, including Union Ministers and the Rakhine State Chief Minister, publicly oversaw and endorsed these resettlement efforts, which effectively entrenched demographic changes in Maungdaw township.[242] These actions indicate that the Myanmar authorities carried out demographic replacement under the guise of development and resettlement , as documented by the Mechanism in a report on Myanmar government efforts to encourage the resettlement of Buddhists from Bangladesh into Rakhine State.[243]

56. The Myanmar authorities also facilitated the use of confiscated Rohingya farmland by non-Rohingya ethnic communities. Reports in state media confirmed that agricultural machinery, seeds and livestock inputs were distributed to resettled communities in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, including in U Daung.[244] The UEHRD publicly acknowledged harvesting rice from fields abandoned after the displacement of Rohingya, with claims that proceeds were recorded and would be returned to "rightful owners" if they could establish ownership.[245] In practice, these measures entrenched the dispossession of the Rohingya while providing tangible state support to non-Rohingya communities resettled on their land.

57. Collectively, the redevelopment, militarization and repopulation projects appear consistent with a deliberate policy to erase Rohingya presence, severing their ancestral ties, and ensuring the consolidation of state and security control over formerly Rohingya villages in northern Rakhine State.

E. Destruction of evidence through alteration of physical locations

58. On 23 January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered Myanmar to take effective measures to preserve evidence related to alleged acts of genocide against the Rohingya, as part of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.[246] The Court issued the order, in response to The Gambia's request for provisional measures that emphasized that Myanmar must not destroy, alter, or render inaccessible evidence, including the remains of victims or the physical locations where alleged genocidal acts occurred.[247] The ICJ recognized that the preservation of such evidence was essential to The Gambia's right to seek Myanmar's compliance with its duty to prevent and punish genocide under the Genocide Convention, which prohibit killing, causing serious harm, inflicting destructive conditions of life, preventing births, and acts such as conspiracy, incitement, attempt or complicity in genocide.[248]

59. Myanmar's systematic demolition and razing of Rohingya villages and construction of BGP Battalion bases on these sites has destroyed or permanently concealed much evidence of what occurred during the 2017 clearance operations. These actions have eliminated forensic evidence such as mass graves,[249] burned structures,[250] victims' remains and personal effects[251] that could demonstrate patterns of persecution,[252] methods of killing,[253] and the identities of

victims and perpetrators. Such destruction may also eradicate ballistic,[254] blast pattern and weapons evidence,[255] as well as documentation showing property ownership,[256] victim targeting,[257] or links between military leadership and field operations.[258] By fundamentally altering or destroying crime scenes, Myanmar authorities have obstructed the possibility of on-site investigations and forensic analysis, making other forms of evidence, such as official records, geospatial and aerial imagery, crime scene photographs, environmental spatial evidence, and open-source material, indispensable in the investigation of destruction and dispossession of Rohingya homes, businesses, farms, schools and places of worship.

VI. Reparations

60. For the Rohingya, reparations for land and property loss are particularly significant and align with precedents from international claims bodies such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission[259] and the UN Compensation Commission.[260] However, Rohingya victims face unique evidentiary barriers, including decades of systemic discrimination, restricted access to property records, forced displacement during the 2017 clearance operations, and ongoing conflict in Rakhine State. To address these challenges, evidence should extend beyond formal documentation to include geospatial imagery, witness testimony, and other material proof of destruction and dispossession. Recognizing these barriers is critical to ensuring fair and timely reparations that reflect the gravity of crimes suffered. Ultimately, reparations should be victim-centered, proportionate and restorative, offering tangible acknowledgment of harm while supporting the Rohingya's pursuit of justice, dignity and connection to their homeland.

VII. Conclusion

61. The evidence summarized above substantiates Rohingya claims that Myanmar state authorities and associated actors destroyed and dispossessed Rohingya land and property during and after the 2017 clearance operations. The evidence collected by the Mechanism demonstrates the theft of Rohingya land and property and identifies some beneficiaries of that appropriation, the entities that financed the demolition of Rohingya villages, the entities and units responsible for executing the demolition, and the subsequent construction of BGP Battalion bases on former residential, agricultural and ancestral sites. Myanmar authorities systematically destroyed Rohingya villages, mosques, cemeteries and farmland. They had knowledge of Rohingya land rights and tenure through official records. The Myanmar military, BGP and Rakhine State government coordinated demolitions, resettlement of non-Rohingya groups, and construction of BGP Battalion bases over seized land. Private companies and associated individuals played a direct role by providing machinery and labor to bulldoze villages and build infrastructure under state contracts. By destroying and repurposing Rohingya farms, homes, businesses and land, the authorities reinforced the effects of the clearance operations and forced deportations, and created very serious impediments to the ability of Rohingya to ever reconstitute the communities where they had lived for generations. As noted in the jurisprudence cited above, these acts could be evidence of the commission of an underlying act intended to destroy the group under the Genocide Convention.[261]

62. The United Nations Human Rights Council has affirmed that Myanmar must ensure reparations for the victims and survivors of the past and ongoing grave human rights violations and atrocity crimes committed at the hands of the Myanmar military.[262] The Human Rights Council emphasized that victims must be afforded "justice, truth, reparations, and guarantees for non-repetition" as part of accountability processes, including before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC). The Human Rights Council has also endorsed full implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State including on "reparations for appropriated land."[263]

63. Reparations for the Rohingya must go beyond symbolic recognition or aspirational promises of return. Reparations are not solely financial; they serve to acknowledge the crimes committed and affirm the humanity of the victims. They declare that the violations suffered were not simply a tragedy, but a calculated dispossession that must be remedied.

64. The Mechanism has conducted comprehensive analysis of extensive documentary and witness evidence and is prepared to provide a full compilation of evidence and its analytical findings, including evidence regarding the roles and criminal responsibilities of certain individuals not included in this public document, to competent national or international authorities upon request. The Mechanism also stands ready to support reparations processes by providing access to its repository of materials and documentation in line with its mandate and Terms of Reference.

Annex 1: Example of referenced imagery from Myo Thu Gyi – No. 5 BGP Battalion base



25 May 2017
[**IIMM0028689552, pg. 27:** Myo Thu Gyi, European Space Imaging, © 2025 Maxar]



16 September 2017
[**IIMM0028689552, pg. 29:** Myo Thu Gyi, European Space Imaging, © 2025 Maxar]

9 April 2018
[**IIMM0001503194:** Extract from aerial photograph]

28 September 2019
[**IIMM0028689552, pg. 33:** Myo Thu Gyi, Airbus Defence and Space, © 2019 Pleiades, CNES]

[1] For further information, see **IIMM0028132184** Analytical Note (IIMM), *Timeline of State Measures Targeting or Impacting Rohingya*, 22 April 2024.
[2] This Analytical Note is produced on the basis of the work of the IIMM Financial Investigations Team.
[3] [redacted]
[4] E.g. [redacted] "Property Record Booklet", officially issued by "Border Immigration Headquarters," or *Na Sa Ka* (နယ်စပ်ဒေသ လူဝင်မှုစစ်ဆေးရေး ကွပ်ကဲမှုဌာနချုပ်)[4] in Rakhine State, 21 August 2011.
[5] E.g. [redacted] Annual Land Tax document, 2014-2015; [redacted] *"Myay Khun Pyay Sar"* (မြေခွန်ပြေစာ) *or "horonsor"* in Rohingya, a land tax certificate issued by the Land Management Office (မြေစာရင်းရုံး) or the *ameen* office, 2014-2015.
[6] E.g. [redacted] Form 105/106 (ပုံစံ-၁၀၅/၁၀၆), undated; [redacted]; [redacted] Form 105/106 (ပုံစံ-၁၀၅/၁၀၆), 5 April 2008.
[7] E.g. [redacted] Revenue Stamps from Internal Revenue Department (ပြည်တွင်းအခွန်များဦးစီးဌာန) for bilateral sale and purchase agreement contracts (အရောင်းအဝယ်စာချုပ်) of land, property and businesses, 2 February 2003.
[8] E.g. [redacted] Sale slip issued by the Myanmar Agricultural Produce Trading (MAPT), 26 February 2001; [redacted] Sale slip for agricultural products, 5 January 1995; [redacted]
[9] E.g. [redacted] Application for Permission to Dig the Drinking Water Pond Deeper, 7 April 2010.
[10] [redacted]
[11] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**
[12] [redacted]
[13] **IIMM0028673656** Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 2017-2018 Budget, E/2017-18(Budjet)/BE(P-15), p. 19.
[14] **IIMM0028728575** Irrawaddy, "Reporter's Notebook: Understanding Maungdaw's Reality", September 2017.
[15] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State, titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**
[16] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 33-34.
[17] Ibid. at pp. 13, 39-40.
[18] Ibid. at pp. 14, 41-42.
[19] Ibid. at pp. 14, 41-42.
[20] Ibid**.** at pp. 14, 43-44.
[21] **IIMM0028689786** UNOSAT satellite imagery-based damage and security assessment on behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 18 and 64.
[22] Ibid. at pp. 18 and 65.
[23] Ibid. at pp. 6, 20, and 67.
[24] Ibid. at pp. 18 and 65.
[25] **IIMM0028665927** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.10.20 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017; **IIMM0028665928** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.11.44 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017; **IIMM0028665929** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.12.30 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017.
[26] **IIMM0028665930** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.40.36 PM", MP4 Video, 24 December 2018.
[27] **IIMM0028665922** "RS0220231027_BVR_2023_10_21_16_14_45", MP4 Video, 23 January 2020.
[28] [redacted]
[29] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information",

March 2019, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**

[30] **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[31] **IIMM0001503018** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Myin Hlut, 9 April 2018.

[32] **IIMM0019628078** [redacted] "Satellite-Detected Fires and Smoke Plumes (25 August - 04 September 2017)".

[33] **IIMM0000002400** Amnesty International, "We Will Destroy Everything", 2018, p. 130.

[34] **IIMM0001503474, IIMM0001503481, IIMM0001503488** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Hpu Khar Li, 9 April 2018.

[35] **IIMM0000002400** Amnesty International, "We Will Destroy Everything", 2018, p. 130.

[36] **IIMM0028034566** Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II(c)

[37] **IIMM0028728627** ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p.3, 3 February 2015, para. 161.

[38] **IIMM0028728428** *Tolmir* Trial Judgement, para. 740.

[39] **IIMM0028687418** *Blagojević and Jokić* Trial Judgement, para. 562.

[40] **IIMM0028687418** Ibid. at para. 675 (noting the forcible transfer of Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica and burning of houses "sen[t] the clear message that they had nothing to return to").

[41] **IIMM0028728408** *Kayishema and Ruzindana* Trial Judgement, para. 116 (interpreting the conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's physical destruction whole or in part to include "withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable period").

[42] **IIMM0028728409** *Karadžić* Trial Judgement, para. 5664 (noting "the anxiety as well as feelings of helplessness and betrayal, which underpin an unwillingness or inability to return to their former homes" will affect their ability to "live normal and constructive lives").

[43] **IIMM0028728413** *Lubanga* AC Amended Reparations Order, para. 45.

[44] **IIMM0028728403** Declaration of Basic Principles, Annex, para. 2 ("The term 'victim' also includes […] persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation").

[45] **IIMM0028728415** *See Prosecutor v Lubanga*, ICC Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06-3466-Red, Public Redacted version of Judgment on the appeals against Trial Chamber II's 'Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable',18 July 2019, para. 38 and references therein (hereafter "*Lubanga* AC Judgment on Decision setting Liability"); **IIMM0028728411** *Ntaganda* TC Reparations Order, paras 71-72.

[46] **IIMM0028728403** Declaration of Basic Principles, Annex, para. 2("The term 'victim' also includes […] persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation").

[47] **IIMM0028728404** Basic Principles and Guidelines, para. 13.

[48]**IIMM0028728404** Ibid., paras 19-22.

[49] *See* **IIMM0028728419** *Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v Albania),* Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 244; **IIMM0028728420** *Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo),* Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 324; **IIMM0028728421** *Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua),* Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 2018, p. 15.

[50] **IIMM0028728422** *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),* Reparations, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2022, p. 51, para. 106.

[51] **IIMM0028728413** *Prosecutor v Lubanga*, ICC Appeals Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA, Order for Reparations (amended), 3 March 2015, para. 5 (hereafter "*Lubanga* AC Amended Reparations Order"); **IIMM0028728411** *Prosecutor v Ntaganda*, ICC Trial Chamber VI, ICC-01/04-02/06-2659, Reparations Order, 8 March 2021, para. 45 (hereafter "*Ntaganda* TC Reparations Order"); **IIMM0028728417** *Prosecutor v Lubanga*, ICC Trial Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 7 August 2012; **IIMM0028728403** Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, A/RES/40/34 (1985) (hereafter "Declaration of Basic Principles"); **IIMM0028728404** Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147 (2005) (hereafter "Basic Principles and Guidelines").

[52] [redacted]

[53] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[54] [redacted]

[55] The Myanmar Security Forces is the umbrella term that refers to both the Myanmar military as well as the Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) and the Myanmar Police Force.

[56] [redacted]; **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[57] [redacted]

[58] [redacted]

[59] **IIMM0001503098, IIMM0001503106, IIMM0001503114, IIMM0001503122** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at U Daung, 9 April 2018.

[60] Including a [redacted] shop worth approximately 65 *lakh kyat,* based on an estimate of the shops value prior to the 2017 clearance operations.

[61] **IIMM0000017432** Action Plan of the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine (UEHRD), undated; **IIMM0008488369** The work of UEHRD Committee - Dr. Win Myat Aye - Union Minister - Deputy Chairman - UEHRD Committee, undated.

[62] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[63] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**.

[64] [redacted]

[65] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw,* Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[66] **IIMM0001139831** *Information Committee Press Release: Arrangements made to systematically harvest ownerless monsoon paddy, sell and return money to original owners*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 1.

[67] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[68] **IIMM0001139831** *Union Minister Dr. Pe Myint and media in Rakhine*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 6.

[69] **IIMM0001138817** *Maungtaw residents to begin farming with gov't help*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 5 April 2018, p. 1.

[70] [redacted]

[71] [redacted] Annotated Google Earth Imagery of Myo Thu Gyi, January 2017; [redacted]

[72] [redacted]

[73] **IIMM0028680446** "RS15_20230220_BVR_2023_02_16_16_48_40", MP4 Video 16 February 2023

[74] [redacted]

[75] [redacted]

[76] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 11, 27-28.

[77] [redacted]

[78] **IIMM0028728575** Irrawaddy, "Reporter's Notebook: Understanding Maungdaw's Reality", September 2017 (reporting that Myo Thu Gyi had been 'reduced to a heap of ash' and providing photographic evidence gathered during an authorised visit by 22 local and international journalists).

[79] **IIMM0028665924** "RS07_20200608_1_cRS15_video_2020-06-08_19-07-38", MP4 Video, 26 May 2020.

[80] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 10-12, 26-34.

[81] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department),

Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**.

[82] **IIMM0001139634** *Monsoon paddy harvested in Rakhine State by Agricultural Mechanisation Department*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 10 November 2017, p. 6: "A total of 934 acres in Kanpu, Kyaungtaung, Myo-thugyi, Ohntaw, alethankyaw, Nwayo Netaung, and Wah Cha villages of Maungtaw township were harvested from 26 October to 8 November."

[83] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**; **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[84] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 33-34.

[85] **IIMM0028632309** "Reporting the state of building a new garrison for No. 5 Border Guard Police Battalion" from No. 1 Border Guard Police Command Office, Kyee Kan Pyin, Maungdaw, Document No. 1017 (10)/110/G1, 9 March 2018, To Myanmar Police Force Headquarters Security Section / Intelligence) Nay Pyi Taw; **IIMM0028632309** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632308.**

[86] **IIMM0028665924** "RS07_20200608_1_cRS15_video_2020-06-08_19-07-38", MP4 Video, 26 May 2020.

[87] **IIMM0028632307** "No. 5 Border Guard Police Battalion, Myoet Thugyi tract, State of building construction completion documentation photo", undated; **IIMM0028632307** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632306**.

[88] **IIMM0001503201, IIMM0001503194, IIMM0001503208** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Myo Thu Gyi, 9 April 2018.

[89] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 10-12, 26-34.

[90] **IIMM0028665924** "RS07_20200608_1_cRS15_video_2020-06-08_19-07-38", MP4 Video, 26 May 2020.

[91] **IIMM0000011887** Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 17 September 2018, para. 871.

[92] Ibid. at pp. 13, 33, and 34.

[93] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pps. 33-34, pp. 13, 39-40.

[94] Ibid. at pp. 14, 33, 34, 44, and 44, 33-34.

[95] Ibid. at pp. 14, 33, and 34.

[96] Ibid. at pp. 14, 33, and 34.

[97] [redacted]

[98] [redacted]

[99] [redacted]

[100] [redacted] Property Record Booklet, 21 August 2011; [redacted] *Horonsor* land tax certificate issued by the Land Management Office, 15 July 1991; [redacted] Sale slip of rice, 1 May 1995.

[101] [redacted]

[102] [redacted]

[103] **IIMM0028689786** UNOSAT Satellite imagery-based damage and security assessment on behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, p. 65.

[104] Ibid. at p. 14.

[105] Ibid. at pp. 18, 19, and 64.

[106] Ibid. at pp. 18 and 65.

[107] Ibid. at pp 20, 65, and 67.

[108] Ibid. at p. 20.

[109] [redacted]

[110] [redacted]

[111] [redacted]

Annual Land Tax Receipt, 2014-2015; [redacted] Annual Land Tax Receipt, 15 July 1991.
[112] [redacted] Application for Permission to Dig the Drinking Water Pond Deeper, 7 April 2010.
[113] **IIMM0028680421** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.03 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028680420** "RS02_180201_WAV 2018-03-01 at 6.41.53 PM," MP4 Video, 1 March 2018; **IIMM0028665912** "RS02171207_WAV 2017-12-07 at 6.42.45 PM," MP4 Video, 23 January 2020.
[114] [redacted] Application for Permission to Dig the Drinking Water Pond Deeper, 7 April 2010.
[115] [redacted] Annual Land Tax Receipt, 2014-2015; [redacted] Annual Land Tax Receipt, 2014-2015.
[116] [redacted]
[117] [redacted]; **IIMM0028680421** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.03 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028680436** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.58.52 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018; **IIMM0028680428** "RS02_180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 4.53.08 PM," M4P Video, 16 February 2018; **IIMM0028680423** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.17 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028680422** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.16 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028665935** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.37 PM," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665936** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.38 PM," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665937** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.40 PM (1)," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665938** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.40 PM," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665939** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.41 PM," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665940** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.43 PM (1)," JPEG, 6 December 2017; **IIMM0028665941** "RS08_171206_WAI 2017-12-06 at 2.10.43 PM," 6 December 2017.
[118] **IIMM0028665911** "RS02171207_WAV 2017-12-07 at 6.28.12 PM," MP4 Video, 23 January 2020; **IIMM0028665910** "RS02171207_WAV 2017-12-07 at 6.20.06 PM," MP4 Video, 23 January 2020.
[119] **IIMM0028665931** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.43.15 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018; **IIMM0028680428** "RS02_180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 4.53.08 PM," M4P Video, 16 February 2018; **IIMM0028665927** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.10.20 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017; **IIMM0028665928** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.11.44 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017; **IIMM0028665929** "RS12_171213_WAV 2017-12-13 at 2.12.30 PM", MP4 Video, 13 December 2017.
[120] **IIMM0028680421** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.03 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018.
[121] **IIMM0028665930** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.40.36 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018.
[122] **IIMM0028680420** "RS02_180201_WAV 2018-03-01 at 6.41.53 PM," MP4 Video, 1 March 2018.
[123] **IIMM0028665931** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.43.15 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018.
[124] **IIMM0028632319** "Map showing Ah Lel Chaung village tract where a new Border Guard Police base will be built" p. 1, "Table showing land of new Border Guard Police to be built by types of land," p. 3, and "Map showing land location where police battalion is to be constructed," p. 4, bearing the stamps of the Land Measurement, Land Management Inspector, and Township Management Departments under the Department of Agricultural Land and Statistics (Buthidaung Town). **IIMM0028632318** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632319**.
[125] **IIMM0028665922** "RS0220231027_BVR_2023_10_21_16_14_45," MP4 Video, 23 January 2020; supra note 117.
[126] **IIMM0028665914** "RS02180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 5.02.53 PM.mp4," MP4 Video, 16 February 2018.
[127] **IIMM0028680421** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.03 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028665914** "RS02180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 5.02.53 PM.mp4," MP4 Video, 16 February 2018.
[128] [redacted] **IIMM0028680422** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.16 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018.
[129] **IIMM0028680431** "RS02_180719_WAV 2018-07-19 at 9.27.45 PM," MP4 Video, 18 July 2018.
[130] **IIMM0028665914** "RS02180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 5.02.53 PM.mp4," MP4 Video, 16 February 2018.
[131] **IIMM0028680422** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.16 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018.
[132] **IIMM0000011887** Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 17 September 2018, para. 856.
[133] **IIMM0000011887** Report of the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, 17 September 2018, para. 856.
[134] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], pp 22-32, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA),; **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA);

IIMM0028632317 is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**

[135] [redacted] Shrimp Hatchery License, 3 March 2004.

[136] [redacted]

[137] [redacted]

[138] [redacted] Inheritance land transfer document (Assent of Property), 3 June 2002.

[139] [redacted] Dowry land transfer document, 21 May 2014.

[140] [redacted]

[141] [redacted]

[142] [redacted]

[143] [redacted]

[144] [redacted] Revenue Stamps from Internal Revenue Department for bilateral sale and purchase agreement contracts of land, property and businesses, 2 February 2003; [redacted] Inheritance land transfer document (Assent of Property), 3 June 2002; [redacted] Revenue Stamp for sale of land , 30 April 1991; [redacted] Revenue Stamp for sale of land, 30 January 2002; **IIMM0028630956** Revenue-stamped sales contracts from 1980 through 2016; [redacted] Annual Land Tax Receipt, 20 February 2015; [redacted] Dowry land transfer document, 21 May 2014; [redacted] Revenue Stamp for sale of land plot, 31 December 2016.

[145] [redacted]

[146] [redacted] Revenue Stamp for 0.2 acres as collateral for loan, 5 July 2006.

[147] [redacted] Revenue Stamp for loan, undated.

[148] [redacted]

[149] [redacted]

[150] **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[151] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], pp. 22-32, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**; **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[152] **IIMM0001503010, IIMM0001503026, IIMM0001503018** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Myin Hlut, 9 April 2018.

[153] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 9-10.

[154] [redacted]

[155] [redacted]

[156] One *dun* of land is equivalent to 16 *kani*, with a *kani* a unit of measurement equivalent to 1.322 acres. See: [redacted]

[157] [redacted]

[158] [redacted]

[159] **IIMM0028727758** "RS15_20250303_BVR_2024_11_28_11_05_57," MP4 Video, 28 November 2024.

[160] **IIMM0019628078** [redacted] "Satellite-Detected Fires and Smoke Plumes (25 August - 04 September 2017)".

[161] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[162] **IIMM0001503474, IIMM0001503481, IIMM0001503488** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Hpu Khar Li, 9 April 2018.

[163] [redacted]

[164] **IIMM0028727757** "RS15_20250303_BVR_2024_10_31_17_27_28", MP4 Video, 31 October 2024.

[165] [redacted]

[166] **IIMM0028680436** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.58.52 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018.

[167] **IIMM0028665925** "RS11_171205_WAV 2017-12-05 at 1.16.37 PM," MP4 Video, 3 December 2017; **IIMM0028665926** "RS11_171205_WAV 2017-12-05 at 3.30.04 PM," 3 December 2017.

[168] **IIMM0028665913** "RS02180216_WAV 2018-02-16 at 4.57.47 PM," MP4 Video, 16 December 2018.

[169] [redacted] **IIMM0028680433** "RS09_20200409_2Q_VIDEO_20200409_152330," MP4 Video, 5 March 2020; **IIMM0028665945** "RS15_20200804_cRS15_R_26-07-2020_180858," MP4 Video, 26 July 2020.

[170] **IIMM0028632311** District General Administration Department, Maungdaw District, "Report on the incidents of violence in Maungdaw District in 2012-2014-2016-2017", 10 August 2018, "List of damages", p. 52. **IIMM0028632311** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632310.**

[171] [redacted]

[172] **IIMM0028632319** "Table showing land of new Border Guard Police to be built by types of land," p. 3, undated.

[173] [redacted]

[174] **IIMM0028728439** Ellen Goldstein, *Damned If You Do: Foreign Aid and My Struggle to Do Right in Myanmar*, Ballast Books (2023), "Hope for Harvesters", p. 104.

[175] Ibid., p. 105.

[176] Ibid., p. 104.

[177] **IIMM0001139831** *Information Committee Press Release: Arrangements made to systematically harvest ownerless monsoon paddy, sell and return money to original owners*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 1.

[178] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[179] **IIMM0001139831** *Union Minister Dr. Pe Myint and media in Rakhine*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 6.

[180] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw,* Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[181] **IIMM0001139831** *Information Committee Press Release: Arrangements made to systematically harvest ownerless monsoon paddy, sell and return money to original owners,* Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 1.

[182] **IIMM0001139954** *Over 5500 acres of paddies winnowed in Maungtaw,* Global New Light of Myanmar, 7 December 2017, p. 6.

[183] **IIMM0001139831** *Union Minister Dr. Pe Myint and media in Rakhine*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 15 November 2017, p. 6.

[184] Ibid., p. 12, "the money obtained will be put in a government bank account. This money will not be used for development projects in Maungtaw region but arrangements are being made to return this money to those who have fled their villages upon their return."; **IIMM0001139417** *Sales from Maungtaw paddy kept as national budget*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 November 2017, p. 6: Interview with Rakhine State Chief Minister U Nyi Pu about the harvesting, sale and earnings from "ripe paddies that are left untouched" in northern Rakhine State after the August 2017 clearance operations in which he describes plans to "sell most of it to a merchant in Maungdaw for USD 2.65 per basket (40.88 kg)" as well as government support for the sale and the "deposit of earned money in a bank account for the national budget."

[185] **IIMM0028728439** Ellen Goldstein, *Damned If You Do: Foreign Aid and My Struggle to Do Right in Myanmar*, Ballast Books (2023), "Hope for Harvesters", pp. 103-106.

[186] **IIMM0000001157** UNOSAT, "Understanding developments in northern Rakhine State through satellite imagery and geospatial technologies", 24 May 2019, p. 4.

[187] Ibid.

[188] Ibid. at p. 7.

[189] Ibid.

[190] **IIMM0001139053** *Local, foreign media personnel reach Sittway on way to Maungtaw*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 24 April 2018: "*Some 13 media personnel from MNA, MRTV, MITV, TBS, TV Asahi, CRI, Xinhua, AFP, VOA, BBC, the Mainichi Newspaper and RFA are participating in the trip. The media personnel will collect news in Maungtaw region of Rakhine State from 24 to 25 April.*"; **IIMM0028728571** "Canada's Special Envoy to

Myanmar update on Rohingya crisis," Global Affairs Canada, 15 February 2018: My aerial tour of northern Rakhine State revealed the full extent of the destruction of the Rohingya communities."

[191] **IIMM0028728506** Index of 95 aerial images with geocoordinates.

[192] [redacted]

[193] [redacted]

[194] [redacted]

[195] [redacted]

[196] [redacted]

[197] [redacted]

[198] **IIMM0028125477** "RS02_191019_WAI 2019-10-19 at 12.42.30 PM," JPEG, 19 October 2019.

[199] **IIMM0028680441** "RS15_20220630BVR_2022_06_29_10_26_51," MP4 Video, 29 June 2022

[200] [redacted]

[201] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**.

[202] Ibid.

[203] Ibid.; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 1, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**.

[204] Ibid.

[205] **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**; **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], pp. 22-36; Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 2, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**

[206] **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**.

[207] **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632314**; **IIMM0028632304** "Status of Land Clearing Operation", [undated], Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632305** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632304**; **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 1, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316**.

[208] **IIMM00000001157** UNOSAT, "Understanding developments in northern Rakhine State through satellite imagery and geospatial technologies", 24 May 2019.

[209] **IIMM0001139551** *Redevelopment of Maungtaw region as per Disaster Management Law – Dr Win Myat Aye,* Global New Light of Myanmar, 27 September 2017, p. 9.

[210] **IIMM0028131284; IIMM0028131287** Law Amending the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Law 2018, 11 September 2018, paragraph 22 (Section 20(b), (ii) and (iii).

[211] [redacted]; **IIMM0028124412** Read-out from meeting with State Secretary, 2 January 2018: "*The State Secretary ... stressed that the current situation does not allow for a return to places of origin as Muslim property sites are now controlled by the government according to the existing land law (burnt sites revert to state ownership).*"

[212] [redacted]

[213] [redacted]

[214] Township administration offices are under the General Administration Department (GAD) of the Ministry of Home Affairs; **IIMM0028673670** Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 2018-2019 Budget, D PC-2 (2018 Table Wide)SM7, pg. 8.

[215] **IIMM0028632314** "*List of complete land cleansing for the burned area in Maungdaw Township*," 24 February 2018, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632315** is the English

translation of **IIMM0028632314**.

[216] **IIMM0028632316** Letter from the District Administration Office (General Administration Department), Maungdaw Township to the State Chief Minister, Rakhine State titled "Issues to prepare and send information", March 2019, p. 1, Source: Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA); **IIMM0028632317** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632316.**

[217] **IIMM0028673656** Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 2017-2018 Budget, E/2017-18(Budget)/BE(P-15), p. 19

[218] **IIMM0028673670** Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) 2018-2019 Budget, D PC-2 (2018 Table Wide)SM7, pg. 39-42.

[219] **IIMM0028665931** "RS12_180224_WAV 2018-02-24 at 12.43.15 PM," MP4 Video, 24 February 2018: "*Kwat Kee Ray Muu (BGP commander-in-chief) and Nay Mrae Muu (area commander) have come to our village" during the period that land was being confiscated for the construction of a BGP base."*

[220] **IIMM0028680423** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.17 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018; **IIMM0028680422** "RS02_180213_WAV 2018-02-13 at 12.28.16 PM," MP4 Video, 13 February 2018

[221] **IIMM0028632319** "Map showing Ah Lel Chaung village tract where a new Border Guard Police base will be built" p. 1, "Table showing land of new Border Guard Police to be built by types of land," p. 3, and "Map showing land location where police battalion is to be constructed," p. 4. **IIMM0028632318** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632319**; **IIMM0028632309** "Reporting the state of building a new garrison for No. 5 Border Guard Police Battalion" from No. 1 Border Guard Police Command Office, Kyee Kan Pyin, Maungdaw, Document No. 1017 (10)/110/G1, 9 March 2018, To Myanmar Police Force Headquarters 9 Security Section / Intelligence) Nay Pyi Taw; **IIMM0028632309** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632308.**

[222] [redacted]

[223] **IIMM0028632294** "*The Systematic Destruction and Seizure of Rohingya Settlements: Myo Thu Gyi, Maungdaw Township*", 29 April 2022, Commission for International Justice and Accountability; **IIMM0028728579** Asia World Company Limited, "Asia World Foundation responds to call by UEHRD and contributes not-for-profit road project in Rakhine," 2018.

[224] **IIMM0028728579**Asia World Company Limited, "Asia World Foundation responds to call by UEHRD and contributes not-for-profit road project in Rakhine," 2018; [redacted]

[225] [redacted]

[226] **IIMM0028728611**, **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, p. 14; [redacted]

[227] **IIMM0028632309** "Reporting the state of building a new garrison for No. 5 Border Guard Police Battalion" from No. 1 Border Guard Police Command Office, Kyee Kan Pyin, Maungdaw, Document No. 1017 (10)/110/G1, 9 March 2018, To Myanmar Police Force Headquarters 9 Security Section / Intelligence) Nay Pyi Taw; **IIMM0028632309** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632308. IIMM0028632308** Report on the progress of construction of a new garrison for No.5 BGP Battalion, 09 March 2028; **IIMM0028632309** is the English translation of **IIMM0028632308**.

[228] [redacted]

[229] [redacted]

[230] [redacted]

[231] [redacted]

[232] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 33-34.

[233] **IIMM0028665924** "RS07_20200608_1_cRS15_video_2020-06-08_19-07-38", MP4 Video, 26 May 2020.

[234] **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Satellite Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 14, 33, 34.

[235] **IIMM0028689786** UNOSAT Satellite imagery-based damage and security assessment on behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp 20, 65 and 67.

[236] **IIMM0028689786** UNOSAT Satellite imagery-based damage and security assessment on behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, p. 20.

[237] **IIMM0028665922** "RS0220231027_BVR_2023_10_21_16_14_45", MP4 Video, 23 January 2020; supra note 125.

[238] **IIMM0001503018** Aerial photographs with metadata indicating GPS coordinates at Myin Hlut, 9 April 2018; **IIMM0028689552** UNOSAT Geospatial Imagery-Based Damage and Security Assessment on Behalf of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, Confidential Report, pp. 9-10.

[239] [redacted] **IIMM0001139045** *Mro*

ethnic villagers receive new houses, Global New Light of Myanmar, 12 April 2018, pp. 1, 11. [NB: Myauk Gaung Taung was a Rohingya village prior to the 2017 clearance operations].
[240] **IIMM0001139352** *Authorities assist Bangladeshi families in Maungtaw, Rakhine*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 19 April 2018, pp. 1-2.
[241] Ibid.
[242] Ibid.
[243] **IIMM0028132186** Analytical Note (IIMM), *Analysis of the Myanmar Government's Encouragement of Resettlement by Buddhists from Bangladesh to Rakhine State*, 22 March 2024.
[244] **IIMM0001138817** *Maungtaw residents to begin farming with gov't help*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 5 April 2018, p. 1.
[245] **IIMM0001138817** *We have been ready for repatriation since 23 January 2018: UEHRD Chief Coordinator*, Global New Light of Myanmar, 5 April 2018, pp. 12-13.
[246] **IIMM0028728423** Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Provisional Measures, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 31, para. 86 (3) (hereafter "ICJ Provisional Measures").
[247] **IIMM0028728423** ICJ Provisional Measures, para. 12(c)
[248] Ibid., para. 61.
[249] **IIMM0028728427** *Popović* Trial Judgement, paras. 358 n. 1215, 412–13 (noting identification documents, civilian clothing, prayer beads, Islamic community papers, and DNA found in an exhumed grave helped identify victims).
[250] **IIMM0027998192** *Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, ICTR Trial Chamber, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para. 226 (noting a witness who witnessed his and his mother's houses being burned was able to identify the burnt remains in photographs); **IIMM0028687214** *Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić*, ICTY Trial Chamber, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, paras. 149–50 (noting "[n]on-Serb cultural and religious symbols throughout the region were targeted for destruction," including "mosques and other religious institutions").
[251] **IIMM0028728427** *Popović* Trial Judgement, paras. 358 n. 1215, 412–13 (noting identification documents, civilian clothing, prayer beads, Islamic community papers, and DNA found in an exhumed grave helped identify victims).
[252] **IIMM0028728410** *Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al.* (Military I Trial), ICTR Trial Chamber, ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, 18 December 2008, paras. 1409, 1428 (noting a witness who was separated from his wife and children later identified their bodies by their clothes after their corpses were exhumed three years later).
[253] **IIMM0028728424** *Prosecutor v. Krstić*, ICTY Trial Chamber, IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 2 August 2001, para. 75 (concluding methodical mass executions—as opposed to combat-related killings—took place where exhumed bodies included blindfolds, ligatures, gunshot wounds, and in some cases, severe handicaps)
[254] **IIMM0028728425** *Prosecutor v. Galić*, ICTR Trial Chamber, IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, 5 December 2003, paras. 441–449, 494–496 (hereafter "*Galić* Trial Judgement") (concluding based on ballistic evidence that civilians were deliberately targeted by Bosnian Serb forces); *see also* **IIMM0028728426** *Prosecutor v. Galić*, ICTY Appeals Chamber, IT-98-29-A, Judgement, 30 November 2006, para. 335.
[255] **IIMM0028728425** *Galić* Trial Judgement paras. 441–449, 494–496.
[256] **IIMM0028131136** "RS15_20230321_BVR_2023_02_19_16_42_30", MP4 Video, 19 February 2023, **IIMM0028131135** "RS15_20230321_BVR_2023_02_19_16_35_54," MP4 Video, 19 February 2023; **IIMM0028131134** "RS15_20230321_BVR_2023_02_19_16_29_59", MP4 Video, 19 February 2023.
[257] **IIMM0028728427** *Popović* Trial Judgement, paras. 358 n. 1215, 412–13 (noting identification documents, found in an exhumed grave helped identify victims).
[258] **IIMM0028728437** *Prosecutor v. Mladić*, ICTY Trial Chamber, IT-09-92-T, Judgment Volume 3, 22 November 2017, paras. 2775 nn. 10625–28, 2487 n. 12055 (considering command post reports and logbooks linking perpetrators to operations targeting Bosniaks at Srebrenica).
[259] **IIMM0028728405** *Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission: Final Award: Eritrea's Damages Claims,* Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 26, 17 August 2009, p. 630.
[260] **IIMM0028728406** S/RES/687 (1991), para. 16 (reaffirming that "Iraq … is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage—including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources—or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait").
[261] See para. 8 ("International law").
[262] **IIMM0028728407** A/HRC/RES/59/2, para. 14.
[263] Ibid., para. 24.